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Chapter 8 
Feminist legal theory as  
embodied justice  
Isabel Karpin and Roxanne Mykitiuk 
This chapter examines a shift within feminist legal theory from a central concern 
with sexual difference to one of embodied difference. The subject at the center 
of this theorizing is marked by bodily (as opposed to sexual) difference from 
the normative, self-actualizing individual of legal subjecthood. Bioethical and 
biotechnological inquiries too are concerned with bodily differentiation. Bodies 
discussed in these contexts are often anomalous or pathologized. They are 
brought under scrutiny, when they deviate from what is often regarded as 
"normal," that which is both valorized for its "species typicality" and, by exten-
sion, held out as the "natural" state of being (Buchanan et al. 2000). 
Our feminist theorizing focuses on the link between biological and legal 
accounts of the embodied subject to interrogate the way that these meaning-
making discourses reinforce and challenge each other. This approach provides 
opportunities for rethinking a just response to the existence of non-normatively 
embodied others. Thus, we examine legal responses to the bodies of non-
normative selves: those classified as "disabled" or otherwise anomalous. While 
this shift moves away from a specific focus on women's bodies to bodily differ-
ence more generally, women's bodies remain central to our analysis because the 
liberal conception of the subject valorizes bodily states more easily managed by 
men's bodies. Women, especially through pregnancy, are destined to fail at this 
marker of autonomy and individuality (Karpin 1994; Mykitiuk 1994). The 
impetus for our interrogation originates in the work of feminist legal theorists 
who, along with colleagues in the humanities and social sciences, have 
sought over the last 25 years to (re)position material embodiment as key to 
feminist analysis. While difference is not always manifest along gendered lines, 
feminist legal theory operates as a general jurisprudential matrix within which to 
understand and analyze a broader ideal of embodied justice. 
Here, we map out a legal feminism that invokes a commitment to the multi-
plicity, indeterminacy,  and the contingency of the material self, at the same time 
as recognizing the reality of bodies and the need to live in them. While accepting 
instabilities as inevitable, we do not deny that we have bodies, nor do we seek to 
transcend them. Instead, we argue that law's repertoire of responses should 
move beyond regularization, normalization, and stabilization. 
114 Transcending the boundaries of law 
Reprogenetics, often hailed as allowing women greater choice in selecting their 
children's traits, should be understood as a regulatory mechanism that pressures 
women to have only certain kinds of children. 
Roberts argues that neoliberal policies encourage shifting responsibility for 
poverty and systemic social inequities from the state to the individual and create 
a "stratification of childbearing" in the US. Wealthy women are encouraged to 
take responsibility for potential disability and/or illness in their children through 
genetic technologies, while poor women find their reproduction punished 
through government refusal to provide basic aid or services aimed at addressing 
poverty, inequity, and health care needs. 
Roberts views both these developments as policies that "obscure" the state's 
responsibility in addressing poverty and other social inequities. She encourages 
women to reject policies supporting a "reproductive hierarchy," which are 
harmful to the reproductive freedom of wealthy and poor women. She calls 
on women to support policies that will "improv[e] the social conditions that 
determine children's welfare." 
Michael Thomson is concerned with the common construction of the male 
body as bounded and invulnerable in opposition to the porous, vulnerable 
female body. The male body is typically taken as the "benchmark" body and 
even equated to the "body politic." Thompson uses Fineman's work on 
vulnerability as a starting point for his inquiry into why the male "enfleshed, 
lived body" attracts so little attention in feminist legal theory. His chapter 
explores the political effects of the social discursive construction of gendered 
bodies as "in/vulnerable," as well as attempts to move beyond the benchmark 
male body by challenging the normative conception and arriving at a fuller 
understanding of the lived male body. 
Thomson wants to avoid any ensconcing of "male victimhood" in his focus on 
the male body. However, since it is constituted as "phallic" and "impenetrable," 
"bounded" and "safe," Thomson deems locating vulnerability in the male 
body as important. Concentrating on circumcision, he argues for a feminist 
exploration of the male body's vulnerability. This exploration could go beyond 
normativity to allow renegotiation of social relations through the explanation of 
shared vulnerability. This new project, Thomson hopes, will help in "re-writing" 
the "in/vulnerable" male body in the larger context of multiple vulnerabilities. 
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As part of the deconstruction of liberal feminism, ideals such as independence, 
autonomy, objectivity, and disembodied abstraction have been radically inter-
rogated (Fineman 2000; Thornton 1999; Williams 1991). For instance, Martha 
Fineman offers a compelling critique of liberal individualism through her thesis 
on the inevitability of dependency. Arguing that independence is an imaginary 
state that fails to account for the myriad ways in which dependency is masked or 
managed by familial and intimate relationships, she challenges the fundamental 
claim that independence is a self-evident good toward which we should all strive 
and around which our legal regimes should be organized. The fact that 
individuals almost always "exist in family or relational contexts" undermines the 
primacy of a claim to independence as any kind of ideal state (2000: 14). 
Patricia Williams, too, challenges us to recognize our situated and embodied 
perspective by writing her jurisprudence autobiographically and subjectively. 
In The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991: 3) she announces from the outset that 
"subject position is everything in ... analysis of the law." In doing so, she takes 
issue with a value system based on an unattainable abstract, the disembodied 
"neutral" and "objective" individual who is the subject, interpreter and enforcer 
of law. 
Similarly, Margaret Thornton exposes the way that the liberal subject of law 
is a spectral abstraction denuded of its concrete reality and limitations. In her 
examination of Australian constitutional law she says: 
"constitutionalism" typically involves the treatment of issues at a very high 
level of abstraction so that distinctive private or subjective features are 
sloughed off. Thus, issues ostensibly located within the public domain of law 
can also be hidden from view, if contrary to the interests of benchmark men. 
In this way, the body of an individual complainant can become a mere 
spectre behind the text. 
(Thornton 1999: 754) 
The traditional liberal and rationalist conception of the bounded self; identified 
by a controlling rationality whose integrity must be defended against invasion 
has thus been the subject of a sustained critique within feminist legal discourse. 
The incommensurability of material mutation with the ideology of liberal 
legalism is an essential and motivating device in our feminist theorizing as well. 
It has led us to focus on the relationship among biomedical discourse, law, and 
feminist legal theory as fundamental. Our work is in line with what Fletcher 
et al. (2008: 341) describe as a "shift from more familiar notions of sexual 
difference to embodied differences." 
While engagement with biomedical discourses and health law is a dominant 
organizing frame for our legal theoretical approach, our work is nevertheless 
overtly and determinedly within the genre of feminist legal theory. Our critical 
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engagement with the normative legal subject is a feminist engagement regardless 
of whether the non-normative subject on whose behalf the critique is made is 
gendered female. We make this appropriative claim for feminist legal theory 
not because we reject the possibility of critiques of normativity from other 
quarters indeed we draw heavily on the work of disability studies critiques 
(Davis 2002; Garland-Thomson 1997; Scully 2008; Thomas 2007), postmodern 
philosophies (Grosz 1994; Haraway 1991; Shildrick 1997, 2002) and other 
writings about the body (Bordo 2004; Frank 1995). Rather, our critique of 
normativity derives from and depends on our feminist legal theoretical founda-
tions and their generational origins. The work of Finenan's feminist legal 
theory project, to which this book is a tribute, has been instrumental in this 
regard. 
The ontological role of feminist legal theory does not stop when we discuss 
other kinds of enmbodied lives. Indeed, Shildrick describes the ontological role 
of feminism in the critique of a modernist discourse that devalues other others 
apart from women as follows: 
Since the beginning of its rejuvenation in the second half of the twentieth 
century, feminist theory has been marked by the recognition that many 
of the most fundamental tenets of modernist discourse have supported 
schemata in which not only women, but other others, have been system-
atically devalued. In response, feminism has set up alternative models of 
ontology, epistemology and not least ethics, which challenge both the dis-
cursive primacy of the universal, white, able-bodied, masculinist subject and 
the normative codes by which that subject is supposed to live. 
(Shildrick 2005a: 15) 
She goes onto say that the attention to context and specificity that feminist 
scholarship offers is "a powerful challenge to what counts as the legitimate 
ground for bioethical inquiry" (2005a: 16). We argue that such a feminist sensi-
bility equips us to engage in a thoroughgoing legal critique of normativity more 
generally and normative embodiment specifically. 
I .ii .1.1. 
Our approach to embodiment wrestles with the notion that bodies have 
a material reality ourskin, blood, ligaments, and DNA do exist. However, 
"the meanings of the body are facts of culture--meanings that are provisional, 
multiple and ambiguous, shifting from context to context" (Sclater 2002: 5). 
Embodiment is a construct of shared understandings, made real by scientific/ 
biomedical, cultural, and legal accounts, among others. Biological accounts do 
not simply offer up a description of what is natural. As Sciater (2002: 5) argues, 
while "the body ... appears as a 'natural' entity that seems to stand outside of 
history, society and culture," what we see reflected in the discourse of nature 
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or "the natural," are actually "cultural concerns embedded in the language of 
science; science working to negotiate the boundaries of culture." 
It is necessary to unpack the unstated assumptions about the meanings 
(both natural and cultural) attributed to different forms of embodiment and 
normative embodiment in particular, in both the legal and biomedical contexts 
and where the two cross paths. Here, we interrogate the concepts of normal and 
disabled, healthy and diseased, and able-bodied and impaired. We challenge the 
idea of a "normal," "natural," or "pre-cultural" body as a benchmark against 
which other bodies are judged. "We track the way in which bodies (within 
medico-legal and biotechnological discourses) are regulated and managed in 
relation to shifting normative ideals" (Karpin and Mykitiuk 2008: 414). While 
for Sclater (2002: 5) "the body emerges as a contested site," we focus on law's 
role in adjudicating its meaning. 
Before considering non-normative embodiment, we first examine two instan-
ces where the female reproductive body has confounded the "naturalization" 
of legal categories via biological claims. These cases illustrate the foundations of 
our theory of embodied justice in feminist legal theory that deconstructs the 
disembodied self as the pre-eminent mode of legal selthood. We explore the 
crossover between biotechnological and biomedical accounts of the self and 
those found in law. While law often relies on biological or biomedical explana-
tions to ground its decisions and definitions, we demonstrate how those decisions 
and definitions are not biologically determined. Instead, they are thoroughly 
legal and thus culturally circumscribed. 
The filial body 
Law has been instrumental in defining the filial body. As Roxanne (2002: 776) 
argues, "[t]he social recognition of parenthood by law is [generally] understood 
to follow the biological fact of procreation." Legal relationships of maternity and 
paternity are granted to those assumed to share an intimate biological relation-
ship with a child based on the understanding of biology's role in the creation of 
parenthood. This role differs for men and women. However, the development of 
assisted human reproductive technologies and the consequent fragmentation 
of the biological and social aspects of procreation expose the social construction 
of the existing legal paradigm of filiation: every child is biologically related 
to only two legal parents, one of each sex. 
The so-called "natural facts" about a child's legal mother and father actually 
rely on social and cultural conventions which become reified as "natural" and 
aligned with the biological. Moreover, wrestling with filiation in the context of 
reproductive technologies reveals that while "law recognizes that blood can 
create legal ties ... not all blood relationships are given legal recognition. Law 
does not always mirror nature and often it is more representative of the 'social 
values' it is employed to protect" (Mykitiuk 2002: 776). In light of the develop-
ment and uses of assisted reproductive technologies and the multiple parties who 
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may become involved in the reproductive context, "facts of nature" are brought 
into dispute: 
It becomes possible to see how the "naturalness" of heterosexuality and the 
nuclear family is socially constructed. Not all biological relationships are 
activated as [legal] ones, and law does not recognize that persons are related 
to one another through ties of substance and physical bonding even where 
such ties are not instigated through procreation. 
(Mykitiuk 2002: 777-78) 
The pregnant body 
Law's use of science to negotiate cultural boundaries in the legal treatment of 
the pregnant woman is another arena where a culturally circumscribed idea 
of the "natural" is given articulation and endorsement through legal dicta. 
Significant legislative, judicial, and scholarly energy has been spent debating 
whether a woman and her fetus should be treated as separate biological entities. 
If treated as separate the potential for conflict is foregrounded. If the fetus is 
construed as part of the woman then arguably her rights and autonomy are 
highlighted. Such a construction leaves the law floundering when faced with a 
woman who wants to assert the loss of a fetus by third-party negligence or 
criminal harm as a harm distinct from injury to herself. In these cases, biomed-
ical discourses are utilized to assert a certain view. However, the construction of 
the fetus as a separate entity from the woman or vice versa relies not on the 
ascertainment of clear biological facts but on a decision to highlight either fetal 
differentiation from, or connection to, the woman. 
For example courts in the US have been asked to adjudicate whether a 
woman who takes drugs while pregnant is liable for child endangerment or drug 
trafficking. These arguments are based on biological processes--namely, that the 
drugs were delivered to the child via the umbilical cord after it was born but 
before the cord was cut. Thus, the claim satisfies the legal requirement of bio-
logical separation at the same time as insisting on biological connection (Karpin 
1994). In the Canadian abortion law case, R v. Morgentaler (1988) we find another 
example of the flexible use of biological processes in law. Madam Justice Wilson 
rejected one biological explanation that regards a 24-week-old fetus in utero as 
human life and possible legal person, in favor of another biological definition, 
in accord with common law, that only upon live birth does personhood 
begin (see also Savell 2006, for a comparison with UK and Australia). Similarly in 
Australia in the NSW case of R v. King (2003), a man was convicted of grievous 
bodily harm to a woman after repeatedly kicking her in the stomach and killing 
her fetus. At first instance the Crown failed in its argument that the death of the 
fetus was a form of grievous bodily harm to the mother on the grounds that the 
fetus was a "unique organism." However, on appeal, Chief Justice Spigelman 
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concluded that the fetus is part of the mother and, therefore, she was the subject 
of grievous bodily harm. Commenting further on the question of the relationship 
between a woman and her fetus, the ChiefJustice disavowed biological certainty, 
highlighting the contingent nature of that relationship in law: 
My review of the authorities indicates that there is no clear rule, applicable 
in all situations, as to whether the mother and foetus must be considered as 
one or separate. The answer will turn on the incidents of the particular legal 
situation under consideration including, where relevant, the scope, purpose 
and object of a particular statutory scheme. 
(490) 
By setting the frame for determining whether a mother and fetus are separate as 
dependent on the scope and purpose of the legislation that is providing 
the relevant remedy, the ChiefJustice tacitly acknowledged that the biological is 
cultural or indeed legal. 
In our work on the regulation and prohibition of ex utero embryo research and 
development for reproductive purposes, we show how shifting definitional points 
based in claims to biological certainty are used to sideline women from the pro-
cess of reproductive decision-making. An embryo may be classified as "unsuitable 
for implantation," in which case the woman will not play a role in determining 
whether it is implanted (Van Wagner et al. 2008). By contrast, individuality might 
be attributed to embryonic entities, if not legal personhood based on the asserted 
uniqueness of their DNA (Karpin 2006). Indeed amendments to the Australian 
Prohibition of Human Cloning for Reproduction Act (2002) resulted in redefining 
an embryo based on a precise understanding of the biological point in time when 
individuality is manifest. The amendments adopted "an independently developed 
definition of a human embryo to a slightly later stage in the fertilization process 
(first cell division)" (Lockhart Committee 2005: xv). First cell division was descri-
bed "as determinative on the basis that the community consensus is a 'new and 
unique genetic entity is formed' only after the genetic material from the male and 
female pronuclei combine" (Karpin 2006: 606; Karpin and Ellison 2009). In 
fact, biologically speaking, the embryo has no capacity for individuality (in its 
social and cultural sense) without a woman willing to gestate it to live birth. 
So far we have been using these examples to map out systematically the 
relationship between law and biological accounts of the self. These examples 
point to the capacity to deploy so-called "natural facts" to political, cultural, and 
legal ends. Law uses its own criteria of significance and creates its own truth. It 
continues to reinforce constructions of natural bodies that are in tandem with 
other dominant discourses of the body, particularly biomedical discourses. Law 
has been too ready to defer to scientific and medical expertise about bodies, 
sometimes opting out of addressing fundamental ethical questions and disen-
franchising some citizens. However, law also "undermines its own project by its 
own location in culture, and by its reification of the body as something needing 
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to be regulated" (Sclater 2002: 5). As Sclater (2002: 5) argues, "discourses and 
practices designed to civilise, regulate and manage the unruly, unpredictable 
body proliferate," legislating the body as a contested terrain. At the same time, 
what science knows about the body is shifting and its truth is provisional. As our 
major source of information and meaning about the limits of the human being, 
biomedical assumptions about normality affect law and what it says about 
normality, especially with regard to health care and disability. 
Embodying justice through feminism 
The legal subject in its liberal form has specific capacities that law is supposed to 
facilitate and protect: independence, autonomy, the freedom to make rational 
choices, and protection against incursion. These capacities do not stand up to 
feminist scrutiny. Ostensibly they are attached to a body that is held out as 
normative and around which fundamental values ofjustice, equality, harm, fault, 
and dignity are constructed and defined. However, this body, which is claimed 
to be no body in particular is, in fact, a very particular kind of body (Mykitiuk 
1994). The liberal subject is still the pre-eminent mode of selfhood in law. But it 
is no surprise that that liberal subject is attached to a very specific body: that 
which has accrued sufficient social, economic, cultural, and political resources to 
minimize the impact of its dependency and interconnection with others. Isabel 
has argued elsewhere that: 
[b] odily transgressions do reside within these individuals, but they are 
accommodated to a point where they appear value-neutral, enabling the 
façade of independence to be reified in their favour. Those who demand 
an autonomy of self that incorporates care, responsibility, connection, 
dependence and even immersion with the other are seen as a definitional 
paradox—transgressive, messy mixed-up failures. However, it is this con-
ception of self around which law, social, and biomedical discourses must 
circulate in order to ensure equality and justice. 
(Karpin 2005: 197) 
A feminist reconfiguration of all bodies as unbounded, always dependent, and 
subject to the other would require a complete rethinking of the system of justice 
because it confounds liberalism's individuated self. This approach calls for a 
conception of justice based on bodily connection and dependence. Feminist 
theoretical critiques of liberal subjectivity and their assertion of the inevitability 
of dependence and vulnerability (Fineman 2000, 2008) offer an alternate way of 
responding to embodied relationships in the contexts in which we work, namely 
the crossover between biomedical discourses and law. 
Take for example the broad area of the legal regulation of genetics. A feminist 
legal theory of otherness suggests an alternate way of thinking through the initial 
liberal anxiety produced by the possibility of the intimate connections and 
22 Transcending the boundaries of law 
interconnections that genetics reveals. Regulating in the area of genetics offers 
the perfect opportunity to reconstruct the legal self in feminist terms as inti-
mately connected with and susceptible to inimersion with others. We might use 
genetic discourses for instance "to generate anxiety about the stability of liberal 
identity so that its current beneficiaries find themselves at the margins with the 
rest of us" (Karpin 2005: 197). 
The use of genetic testing has the potential to show that "we are all in 
some way 'impaired' by highlighting the magnitude of human genetic variation, 
and by demonstrating that everyone has genetic 'abnormalities" (Taylor and 
Mykitiuk 2001: 69). Moreover, the use of predictive genetic testing creates a new 
category of people—the "worried well" or the "not yet sick" (Lippman 2006: 
18). The use of genetic technology can have the effect of identifying otherwise 
well individuals with genetic susceptibilities to particular disease as unhealthy or 
with suspect health. People who have been tested often live their lives according 
to strategies of health management and risk minimization to prevent the future 
development of the predicted disease or condition. In some cases the disease or 
condition never develops. Individuals, made to feel vulnerable and genetically 
compromised, do find themselves at the margins with the rest of us. In order to 
appropriate genetic discourses, however, "[1]aw in this new frame must take as 
its base unit a subject that is inevitably connected, vulnerable and dependent" 
(Karpin 2005: 197); for, genetics offers us a unique form of individuality that 
connects us to genetically related others. This form of individuality "disables the 
liberal individual premised on a distinct and separate selfhood. Instead it enables 
or renders able-bodied a transgressive individual whose very selfhood is already 
connected and vulnerable to someone else" (Karpin 2005: 198). 
A central concern animating feminist critiques of law is the unsustainabiity 
of the disembodied subject of law. Female bodies, embryonic bodies, and nor-
mative bodies are given legal definition through the use of biomedical discourses; 
yet, that definition is not fixed in "natural facts." Rather, it is fluid and con-
tingent. In line with the shift from gendered difference to embodied difference, 
highlighted at the chapter's beginning, we turn to engage broader issues of non-
normative embodiment. We will look at law's regulation of conjoined twins 
and people with disabilities. 
Conjoined embodiment 
Conjoined embodiment challenges deeply rooted, internalized, and naturalized 
beliefs concerning the corporeal makeup of a human being. In place of a nor-
mative autonomous, stable, singular, and detached self for whom the body 
is often absent, conjoined embodiment (like pregnancy) offers the unsettling 
prospect of ambiguous and shared bodily boundaries, negotiated selfhood, and 
the possibility of being together in one. In contrast to the normative liberal 
subject, conjoined twins offer a further example of the need for embodiment to 
become an ontological foundation of the self. They suggest the possibility of an 
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attachment to the corporeality of being and a conception of selfhood that is not 
defined and valued by its distinctiveness from the other. 
Conjoined embodiment offers an opportunity to re-craft and rethink both 
the theoretical premises and assumptions that have been used to legitimate the 
normative modern subject and to engage the hegemonic imperatives which 
alienate, oppress, and suffocate non-conforming subject positions. The phenom-
enon of conjoined embodiment implicates both bodily existences that are not 
neatly compartmentalizable and resist classification and bodily existences which 
do not matter, are discounted, or are marginalized 
Conjoined twins, like all other "other" bodies, exist as abject and grotesque. 
They provoke visceral reactions of horror, disgust, sadness, and pity. Moreover, 
the disciplinary regimes, including biomedicine and law, that reify corporeal 
boundedness and subjugate non-normative morphologies are exposed and pro-
blematized by the conjoined twin. As a medical anomaly, conjoined twins are 
categorized as a deformity and a birth defect predicated on the normalcy of 
discreteness of identity. Medical discourses attempt to account for conjointness 
by positing explanations of where something naturally went wrong, how a 
"freak" of nature occurred, and how and why the anomalies should be fixed. 
Biological and medical discourses provide that "siamese twins ... occur 
when ... an egg in the womb fails to divide successfully" (Clark and Myser 
1998: 4). Conjoined embodiment is represented as a condition in which nature 
has neglected to finish its prescribed embryological work. Thus the need to "fix" 
conjoined bodily experiences is built into its very definition. From the outset 
conjoined twins are conceptually crafted as two individuals fused together whose 
"humanness" can only be achieved through medical intervention. The embodi-
ment of conjoined twins is "so threatening to the order of things ... that they are 
almost always surgically normalized" (Garland-Thomson, 2001: 11). 
This approach to embodiment and personhood is taken up in legal discourse. 
A compelling example is the UK case, Re A (Conjoined twins: iVledical treatment) 
(2000). As was the case in Re A, "not infrequently one conjoined twin is 
'sacrificed' to save the other from the supposed abnormality of their embodi-
ment" (Garland-Thompson, 2003: 13). These actions are justified as preventing 
suffering and creating well-adjusted individuals. In Re A, Lord Justice Ward 
makes general comments about the nature of embodiment and its link to dignity 
and integrity to justify the separation that will kill one twin. With respect to the 
twin who will die if surgical separation occurs, he states: 
The only gain I can see is that the operation would, if successful, give Mary 
the bodily integrity and dignity which is the natural order for all of us. But 
this is a wholly illusory goal because she will be dead before she can 
enjoy her independence and she will die because, when she is independent, 
she has no capacity for life ... In terms of her best health interests, there 
are none. 
(998) 
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Nevertheless, Lord Justice Ward ultimately decides in favor of the surgical 
separation, arguing that the life of the twin is so compromised by her depen-
dence on the other twin as to be a life destined  for death: 
In summary, the operation will give Jodie the prospects of a normal 
expectation of relatively normal life. The operation will shorten Mary's life 
but she remains doomed for death. Mary has a full claim to the dignity 
of independence which is her human entitlement. In the words of the 
Rabbinical scholars involved in the 1977 case in Philadelphia, Mary 
is "designated for death" because her capacity to live her life is fatally 
compromised. The prospect of a full life for Jodie is counterbalanced by an 
acceleration of certain death for Mary. That balance is heavily in Jodie's 
favour. 
(1010) 
The fatal compromise to which Mary must succumb is evinced through 
her chronic incapacity for independence compared with her sister Jodie who 
ultimately could live independently. Lord Brooke ends his judgment with a 
similar response to the horror of dependency: "Finally, the doctrine of the 
sanctity of life respects the integrity of the human body. The proposed operation 
would give these children's bodies the integrity which nature denied them" 
(1052). Integrity, for Mary at least, is only available in death. 
Re A highlights the difficulty of relying upon an idealized notion of selfhood 
when analyzing the rights of legal persons. The use of the phrase "the natural 
order" as a benchmark for determining personhood and integrity stands in stark 
contrast to the artificial way in which that natural order must be achieved. 
According to Lord Justice Ward: 
The first step is to take the scalpel and cut the skin. If it is theoretically 
possible to cut precisely down the mid-line separating two individual bodies, 
that is not surgically feasible. Then the doctors have to ascertain which of 
the organs belong to each child. That is impossible to do without invading 
Mary's body in the course of that exploration. There follow further acts 
of separation culminating  in the clamping and then severing of the artery. 
Whether or not the final step is taken within Jodie's body so that Jodie's 
aorta and not Mary's aorta is assaulted, it seems to me to be utterly fanciful to 
classify this invasive treatment as an omission in contra-distinction to an act. 
(1003) 
The use of the language "the natural" as some kind of claim to the right and the 
good is flawed and demonstrates the unstated assumptions and contradictions 
upon which this kind of judgment is made. In this instance, legal and biomedical 
discourses join forces to literally carve out the autonomous legal subject. 
Biomedicine is not just a technology, it is also an interpretive framework that 
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reflects and shapes our attitudes to human diversity, normality, and abnormality. 
As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2002) suggests, in biomedicine there is a per-
vasive will to normalize the non-standard body. One could argue that these 
surgical separations benefit not the affected conjoined twins, "but rather they 
expunge the kinds of corporeal human variations that contradict ideologies the 
dominant order depends on to anchor truths it insists are unequivocally encoded 
in bodies" (Garland-Thomson 2002: 12-13). Of course, in Re A Jodie did benefit; 
she would likely not be alive if her sister had remained attached to her. Yet, in 
many cases the separation of conjoined twins is not driven by the imminence of 
death, but by the unquestioned assumption that such anomalous embodiment 
should be normalized. Referring to the routine consideration of separation of 
conjoined twins made by doctors and parents at birth, Garland-Thomson 
(2002: 12) argues, "So intolerable is their insult to dominant ideologies" about 
who we are and who we are supposed to be "that the testimonies of adults with 
these forms of embodiment who say they do not want to be separated [are] 
routinely ignored, in establishing the rational for medical treatment." 
Sclater (2002: 6) claims that "[L]aw establishes regulations, institutions, and 
institutes expectations about what is legitimate, acceptable, natural and normal." 
It is this "narrative" that "gives law its authority" and the power of law "depends 
less on its ability to coerce and more on its ability to persuade people that the 
world it describes is the only available world" (Sclater 2002: 6). As seen in 
the case of conjoinment, law works together with medicine to literally construct 
the individualistic liberal citizen. Another instance where Sclater's description 
seems apt is law's use of biomedical discourse to regulate the production and 
management of disabled bodies. It is with this in mind that we turn to our final 
example—disability. 
rbJr7rn 
Typically regarded as a problem for the state, for communities, for families, and 
for the individual, disability is not generally understood as a feminist issue. 
However, the importance of feminist theoretical interrogations for discourses 
about disability has been highlighted by a number of disability scholars. Jackie 
Leach Scully states that: 
[d]isabiity ethics, like feminist ethics, is a form of ethical analysis consciously 
and conscientiously attentive to the experience of being/having  a "different" 
embodiment. Where feminist ethics' concern is with the non-normativity 
introduced by gendered bodies ... disability ethics looks at the embodied 
effects of impairment. 
(Scully 2008: 11) 
Bonnie G. Smith (2004: 4) also argues that "the disabled, often are seen as women 
are—either to be too embodied or too frail and wispy to be a real presence." 
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Scully, however, distinguishes between disability as a category of material 
difference and that of gender: 
Disability occupies an anomalous position within the typology of gender, 
class, ethnicity, sexuality or age, because unlike any of these it is possible for 
a person to exist outside the category. One can be not disabled in a way 
that one cannot be not gendered, or not have an age. 
(Scully 2008: 34) 
This assertion that one can exist outside of the category (of disability) adverts to 
the myriad ways in which disability is claimed by medical discourse to distin-
guish the individual from species typicality. In fact, a view of embodiment that 
foregrounds its vulnerability and susceptibility to non-normative states would 
position all of us as variously capable and incapable, able and disabled at any 
given moment. 
Adrienne Asch (2004: 16) suggests that we question the distinction between 
people who have impairments and people who do not and instead consider "which 
people cannot perform which activities in given environments." As Asch states: 
arguably, any person now living could, without any change in his or her 
physical, cognitive, sensory, and emotional make-up, be considered 
impaired by the same employer, government service provider, place 
of public accommodation or educational institution if the individual failed 
to meet particular standards for acceptance into a program or activity that 
the organisation had established. 
(2004: 16-17) 
By arguing that we shift our perspective to the capacities of all bodies and their 
many limits, she suggests reconfiguring our social systems in a way that includes 
the largest range of individuals. All of us are limited by what our bodies are 
capable of doing in a particular social, cultural, and environmental context. 
In this sense the category of "not being able" is one outside of which we cannot, 
in fact, exist. Grounding our legal system and our cultural and social organiza-
tions on the concept of normative ability rather than a range of differing abilities 
results in an unjust and uncompromising framework. What is able bodied is 
actually structured by the environment. 
Turning to law, Asch analyzes the concerns raised by some scholars with the 
use of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (1990) by people who would 
not normally be considered disabled. She argues that opening up disability to a 
multitude of forms of bodily impairment and vulnerability is, in fact, a more 
appropriate and just way to deal with disability. She calls this a "human varia-
tion approach to disability" (Asch 2004: 18), which shifts the balance away from 
a narrow range of required accommodations to a norm of accommodation for 
broad human variation unless (in the case of the ADA which deals with 
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employment discrimination) the employer can prove that essential functions 
cannot be performed. 
This approach accords with the feminist ethic of embodied justice which we 
support. It positions the norm as subject to variation and vulnerable to material 
limits. However as with conjoinment, disability is typically not seen as difference 
to be accommodated. Rather it is considered so disruptive of individual and 
community welfare that it is to be prevented, normalized, eliminated, or cured. 
"Solutions" to the "problem" of disability consistently locate it in the individual, 
not the environment or cultural constructs in which the individual operates. 
In the process, the disabled body/person appears as aberrant. Approaching 
disability as located only within the individual body is sustained by shoring up an 
unexamined conception of normalcy from which the disabled depart. This con-
ception of the "normal" often relies upon biomedical discourses as authoritative 
about the body. Law is a key discourse that relies on biomedical understandings 
of bodies to regulate and resolve disputes. Nevertheless, biomedical under-
standings are not stable, knowable facts of nature but fluid and open to law's 
interpretive purposes. 
O'Connell (2009: 143) argues that "[w]ithin the legal framework, a framework 
that elevates objectivity over subjectivity and valorizes abstractions such as justice 
and fairness, anti-discrimination laws occupy an unusual space as they concern 
themselves with questions of embodiment and materiality in often intimate 
detail." With this in mind we now look briefly at an Australian antidiscrimina-
tion case: Ferris v. .7'few South Wales (2003), where the majority and minority 
judgments used the same biomedical discourse of disability to arrive at different 
conclusions about the meaning of disability and the determination of dis-
crimination. In this case a boy with disabilities resulting from an illness was 
denied the protection of the Australian Disability Discrimination Act (1992) after 
school expulsion due to behavioral problems that caused him to act violently. In 
concluding that the school had not discriminated, the court made a decision to 
cordon the question of the boy's disability from the boy's violent behavior, 
despite the fact that disability was directly responsible for his behavioral issues. 
The court then chose to compare his treatment (i.e. expulsion) with a hypothet-
ical "non-disabled child" who behaved in the same way. Belinda Smith describes 
the court's decision as follows: 
the factual question for the Court was: Did the school treat Daniel the same 
as it would treat a non-disabled student who behaved as Daniel had 
behaved (i.e. violently and disruptively)? The Court found that the answer 
was yes—Daniel was treated as he was treated because of the circumstances 
(i.e. his behaviour) not his disability (which was separated). Thus he was 
found to have been treated the same as a non-disabled comparator in these 
circumstances. This meant that the school had not discriminated against 
Daniel because of his disability. 
(Smith 2007: 16) 
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This case was dealing with a very violent boy and a school that had made 
significant but sometimes flawed attempts to accommodate him. Nevertheless, 
the majority's decision effectively disengaged the boy's disability from his embod-
ied experience of it. Disability here is taken to a "high level of abstraction" 
(Thornton 1999: 756) and consequently its embodied effects are dematerialized. 
O'Connell (2009: 143) describes this as the fragility of anti-discrimination law 
which itself is vulnerable to the "very qualities that are associated with justice." 
She notes, "as cases are appealed to higher courts, they are increasingly 
abstracted and disembodied" (2009: 143). 
The dissenting Purvis judgments of McHugh and Kirby challenged 
the majority's definition of Daniel's disability: "In our opinion, the behavioral 
manifestation of an underlying disorder or condition is itself a disability 
(para. 27). Even the majority judgments of Justice Gunimow, Justice Hayne and 
Justice Heydon accepted that Daniel had suffered brain damage that affected his 
behavior (para. 182). Furthermore, the evidence of a neurologist and a psychol-
ogist was cited to explain the condition as including "disinhibited and unin-
hibited behaviour" (paras. 29, 30, 182). Nevertheless, the majority of the Court 
decided to make the comparator an apparently non-disabled child with the same 
behavior. The majority was particularly swayed by the fact that there was a gap 
in the legislative framework. Because of this gap, had discrimination been found, 
the school could not have argued the exception of "unjustifiable hardship" 
because it was available only on admission to school, not in relation to expulsion. 
The dissenting judges opined that the majority should not have corrected this 
legislative oversight by deciding the case the way they did (see Smith 2007: 19). 
Without describing the legislative framework within which the High Court 
was operating and the constraints posed by the legislation itself, we see that an 
embodied approach to justice would have shifted the focus away from the 
requirement for a "species typical" comparator. Embodied justice would allow a 
move toward inquiry into how the school could accommodate Daniel, examin-
ing the specific environmental and institutional accommodations that would 
need to be in place. Such an approach would recognize that Daniel's violent 
behavior was likely an irreducible part of him and that measures would need to 
be enacted and implemented to include him in the school community (with 
appropriate protective safeguards). 
Yet, we need to be mindful that practices and policies of inclusion often send 
the message that to be disabled is to have a problem that limits, disrupts, or 
prevents the individual from participating in normal life. Brian Pronger, for 
example, argues that: 
The ethics of inclusion, which tries to bring otherness into a system 
while requiring it to manifest itself within the structure of the system, 
appropriates otherness, making it conform to the system. The ethics of 
alterity, in contrast, works not by inclusion but by openness—openness to 
otherness in a way that allows the other to deconstruct the system to call 
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into question the system's limits, particularly in its appropriation of others' 
otherness. 
(2002: 17) 
In the case of Purvis, an ethics of alterity, and a notion of justice as embodied, 
requires us to find a way to welcome Daniel into the school community while 
modifying that institution, its practices, and the social environment, rather than 
expelling the non-normative body or "fixing it" to conform to the system. 
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In our early work we investigated the way in which women were placed as pro-
blematic outsiders. We insisted on bringing women into the picture, bringing 
them into the body of knowledge that informs and is law, while making knowl-
edge of and in law account for women's embodiment. To this end, we have 
explored the legal regulation and construction of the body, and most often 
the gendered body. While a part of this work has focused on the context of the 
use and regulation of new reproductive and genetic technologies, more recently 
we have explored variant corporeality in the context of conjoined twins and 
disability/impairment. 
Our work, while aimed at re-imagining the significance of embodiment to and 
for women and the law, also identifies and explores the uneasy relationship 
between law and embodiment generally and marginalized embodiment in 
particular. Law does not sit in isolation but in relation to a diverse range of 
discourses that make up the body of law. Some of these discourses create the 
body of and in law, while law too shapes the body. In this sense, the body is in 
law, while law is also in the body, and both—law and the body—are necessarily 
bound up with shifting cultural discourses and practices. This matrix of rela-
tionships points to the mutually constitutive nature of both "body" and "law." 
In her 1991 book, Simians, fyborgs and Women, Donna Haraway proclaimed 
that "[l]ife is a window of vulnerability. It seems a mistake to close it. The 
perfection of the fully defended, 'victorious' self is a chilling fantasy ... " (224). 
Haraway, in writing these words, was working within a framework of the bio-
politics of immunity. In biology as in law the self-actualizing fully defended, 
bounded, and autonomous individual is the central figure around which policy, 
theory, and institutions are built. Martha Fineman also challenges us to take 
vulnerability as a central organizing premise and to reconfigure our approach to 
state responsibility and to individual rights and duties around the framework of 
the "vulnerable self." She says: 
What should be the political and legal implications of the fact that we are 
born, live, and die within a fragile materiality that renders all of us con-
stantly susceptible to destructive external forces and internal disintegration? 
Bodily needs and the messy dependency they carry cannot be ignored in 
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life, nor should they be absent in our theories about society, politics 
and law 
(Fineman 2008: 12) 
Our situated, self-conscious, undifferentiated, and embodied selves, and our 
recognition of other "others," are the keys to understanding how we might begin 
to frame a justice system that truly is just; one that "does not defer, but engages 
with, alterity," one that "extends a welcome ... to difference ... [and] comes into 
play precisely where the conventional juridical and moral discourse reaches 
its limit" (Shildrick 2005b: 42, footnotes omitted). Our account of embodied 
difference provides the basis for a form of feminist legal theorizing, which, while 
not always identifiable in gendered terms, offers us a means to push beyond the 
"limit." In doing so, we afford an opening whereby law can "extend a welcome" 
to all kinds of difference, better respond to all forms of injustice, and embrace all 
embodied and vulnerable selves. 
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My scholarship on reproduction has made me acutely aware of the stratification 
of childbearing in the United States. In particular, the social value placed on a 
woman's reproduction depends on her standing within the hierarchies of race, 
class, and other inequitable divisions. My research highlights the harsh dichot-
omy where policies punish poor black women for bearing children but advanced 
technologies assist mainly affluent white women not only to have genetically 
related children, but to have children with preferred genetic qualities. In 
this regard, I have worked with organizations opposing a program offering sub-
stance-abusing women in minority neighborhoods money to be sterilized and 
have attended many conferences where academics debate precisely which traits 
are acceptable to select for when testing an array of embryos for implantation. 
While welfare reform laws aim to deter women receiving public assistance 
from having even one additional healthy baby (Mink 2001), largely unregulated 
fertility clinics regularly implant privileged women with multiple embryos, 
knowing the high risk that multiple births pose for premature delivery and 
low birth weight (Helmerhorst 2004). The public begrudges poor mothers 
a meager increase in benefits for one more child but celebrates the birth of high-
tech septuplets that require a fortune in publicly supported hospital care 
(Andrews 1999). 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the race and class dimensions of 
reproduction, a chief way of creating families, are clear. My prior writing on the 
stratification of reproduction contrasted policies that penalize the childbearing of 
poor nonwhite women with policies that promote childbearing by wealthier 
white women (Roberts 1997). I take a different tack in this chapter. Rather than 
place these two categories of women in opposition, I explore how the privatiza-
tion and punishment of reproduction links them together to avoid public 
responsibility for social inequities. Both population control programs and genetic 
selection technologies reinforce biological explanations for social problems and 
place reproductive duties on women, shifting responsibility for improving social 
conditions away from the state. Reproductive health policies involving both 
